CHILDREN, ARMED VIOLENCE AND TRANSITION:
CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY
Mark Drumbl*
Good morning. As the first speaker on the first panel, I’d like to break
the proverbial ice. Perhaps it is best to do so in two ways. First, I’d like to
set out some introductory concepts that may be helpful for listeners (and
eventual readers) who may not necessarily be well versed with details
regarding child soldiering. Second, I will identify several challenges that I
see as quite pressing for international law and policy when it comes to
transitioning children from armed violence to a better place. In the interests
of clarity and direction, let me say that I will posit seven key challenges.
Before I go any further, however, I’d like to thank Professor Amann and
the Georgia Law School for hosting such an auspicious event. What is more,
Madame Prosecutor, I would like to thank you and your staff for the
herculean efforts that you are undertaking to address the scourge of child
soldiering. Tens of thousands of children worldwide become militarized. A
much larger number of children become affected by militarization. Child
soldiering exists on every continent. It is not limited only to places where
international courts presently operate. It ebbs and flows but persists,
emerging in recent years in Syria, Iraq, Central African Republic, and
Mali—to name only a few places. Many adults, moreover, may have entered
military forces and armed groups as children. Dominic Ongwen is an
obvious example.
It may be helpful to begin with some definitions. Who is a child soldier?
I understand this term to be informed by the 1997 Cape Town Principles and
the 2007 Paris Principles. The Paris Principles eschew the phrase “child
soldiers,” in fact, and prefer the undoubtedly more accurate “children
associated with armed forces or armed groups.”1 The Paris Principles
phraseology is more accurate since it recognizes that militarized children do
much more than serve as combatants. The term child soldiers, albeit popular,
has also become somewhat antiquated. While accurate, or perhaps because
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of its accuracy, the Paris Principles language is tongue-tying and tonguetwisting. I am therefore going to use the term child soldiers as shorthand.
But I understand a child soldier as including spies, sentries, cooks, porters,
sex slaves, forced conjugal partners, as well as fighters (whether carrying
weapons or not). Also, in line with both the Cape Town Principles and the
Paris Principles, the age of eighteen is the terminal point of the protected
category of who is a child soldier.2 The category therefore is chronological
and fixed, rather than liminal and experiential.
In my book Reimagining Child Soldiers, I argue that it is very important
to acknowledge, and even embrace, the reality that there is no “typical” child
soldier. It is imperative to transcend sensationalism and stereotype when
talking about child soldiering. A great diversity of experience arises among
children who become associated with armed forces and armed groups.
Roughly 40% of such children are girls. Some are very young, while
many—likely a clear majority worldwide—are in the fifteen to seventeen
year old age cohort.3
Many children end up as child soldiers because they are abducted,
brutalized, and tortured. Others, however, also exercise a level of initiative
in coming forward and either enlisting or, in some cases, affirmatively
participating in armed groups and armed forces. Youth politicization, and
actualizing politics though martial activities, is not implausible: some
children join movements to try to build a better world. Many child soldiers
are rescued by humanitarian interventions, but some exit militarized life
entirely on their own. Only few child soldiers are involved in the serial
commission of what would be acts of atrocity against civilian populations,
often including other children. Many child soldiers are victims of brutal
indignities. I believe that to effectively deter child soldiering, we need to
recognize the diversity and the kaleidoscopic nature of militarization and
how it affects children.
Let me turn to the seven challenges I posit for international law and
policy. I raise these in the spirit of improving the path of law and policy, and
for enhancing our imagined legal consciousness, when it comes to deterring
child soldiering and reintegrating children affected by militarization and war.
First, while we can hope that transitions move societies from armed
conflict to peace, in reality, transitions proceed from armed conflict to
renewed armed conflict. Even in transitions toward peace, in other words
2
Id.; UNICEF, CAPE TOWN PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES (Apr. 27–30, 1997), http://
www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles%281%29.pdf.
3
See generally MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND POLICY (2012).

2015]

REMARKS: CHILDREN AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 625

away from armed conflict, the post-conflict society may not be free from
violence (criminal violence for example) or autocracy, both of which may
impact negatively upon juveniles. Violence exists in peacetime as well.
Violence that is public in nature and committed by and against children in
times of armed conflict may, after armed conflict, turn into violence
committed by and against children that percolates into private spheres, the
household, and the city block. International lawyers need to recognize that
public violence in armed conflict will not necessarily be eradicated just
because armed conflict ends. Violent masculinities, in particular, may
operationalize themselves in a variety of private contexts that elude the gaze
of the international lawyer and, in many instances, the law altogether
(whether substantively or as a matter of application). Transitional justice
does not have a good track record in dealing with this situation. South Africa
may be evoked as a poignant example.
Second challenge: I think we need to recognize that the mental health of
former child soldiers may not necessarily be as fragile as we may fear. Child
soldiers are resistant, and in many cases resilient. Their strengths need to be
leveraged in post-conflict transitions and in building a citizen-empowered
polity. But this is not to say that child soldiering’s effects are innocuous or
incidental. Great pain abounds despite the resilience. In addition to
psychological trauma and recovery, it’s very important for former child
soldiers to receive occupational training, medical care and rehabilitation for
physical injuries, conflict resolution skills, education, and job preparation.
It’s a tall order, to be sure. But focusing excessively on mental health
aspects diffuses attention from the diversity of mechanisms and tools that
may enhance individual recovery and collective well-being.
Third: criminal trials for adult recruiters, abductors, and enlisters of
children are central to the accountability process. The Lubanga conviction
has considerable expressive value; as did the Special Court for Serra Leone’s
convictions on child soldier related charges.4 However, in and of
themselves, these prosecutions and sentences are not enough. These trials
can only deliver so much. Their value should not be over-marketed, nor
should international lawyers over-promise. A pressing need arises to
deracinate the structural factors that conspire to fuel the conditions in which
young people become militarized. Also helpful is to seriously consider much
broader remedial action, including, reparative justice and remedial justice. If
we focus exclusively on courtrooms and jailhouses, we are hewing to a very
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narrow approach instead of engaging with the pluralistic possibilities that the
law has to offer.
The fourth challenge revolves around the false simplicity of categorizing
age. If the law takes eighteen as a chronological benchmark, it may come
down very hard on people in 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 year-old age bracket.
Compelling neuro-scientific evidence suggests that physiological
development continues to ferment in the eighteen to twenty-five age bracket.
Conversely, persons in the sixteen and seventeen year-old bracket may have
more in common with their contemporaries just over the hump of adulthood
than their contemporaries in the thirteen to fifteen cohort. If it makes a lot of
hay out of a simple birthday, the law may come down very exigently and
very heavily on young adults, even though young adults may suffer
comparable harms and constraints in times of conflict to those faced by older
juveniles. Perhaps it is the ineluctable fate of law simultaneously to indulge,
on the one hand, while being too exigent, on the other. Such is the
inevitability of law’s predilection to draw bright-lines. And bright lines are
simple. Their simplicity, however, belies the much thornier realities of
safeguarding human rights where it really matters—not in the law books but
on the ground. Human rights activists might look more critically at the
convenience of chronological bright lines so that we can do better, however
inconveniently.
Fifth, as I argue in my book, transitional justice is useful when it comes to
facilitating the reintegration and rehabilitation of militarized youth, while
also helping to reconstruct societies that have been plagued by violence,
including violence committed against children and violence committed by
children.5 While I eschew criminal trials, restorative, reparative, and, in
some instances, customary and ceremonial forms of justice can play a very
valuable role in re-anchoring children implicated in the commission of acts
of atrocity within society while also delivering some sense of justice for
victims and survivors. Categories of victim and perpetrator become very
ambiguous in places where children act violently, and are made to act
violently, and fine-grained methods of transitional justice that eschew the
binary reductionism of penal sanction may be particularly apposite in such
contexts. Many individuals who suffer in conflict at the hands of children
may also be children. These children, too, have a right to see their best
interests promoted.
Let me turn to my final two points. International law and policy would do
well to recognize, and revel in, the fundamental tension that lurks within
5
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children’s rights discourse. On the one hand, international human rights law
protects juveniles. On the other hand, international human rights law
emancipates and empowers juveniles. We need to do better at building a
culture of juvenile rights. Yet when lawyers and policy-makers present
children as enfeebled, as helpless and hapless, as victimized, broken, and
incapable—and when we articulate that as a basis to protect children—we
may very well be doing them a disservice. Vibrant citizenship, juvenile
rights, and stakeholdership assume capacity, ability, confidence, strength,
and agency. Protecting children may, therefore, be in tension with
recognizing their political will and capacity to make important choices for
themselves: freedom of expression, freedom of association, reproductive
rights, their ability to have input in custodial determinations, their autonomy
at times to refuse medical treatment. In many post-conflict societies, agedriven gerontocratic pressures that may create conditions for children to
become militarized often persist after militarization ends. These lingering
pressures, then, serve as a conduit for re-militarization or re-criminalization.
One way to quash, or at least relieve these pressures, is to generate a robust
culture of juvenile rights that views young people as able to discharge their
obligations, as being able to be held responsible for their conduct, to
command the respect of others, and to claims societal and communal
obligations.
My final point: The focus on militarized youth, in my opinion, should not
divert our attention from children who are criminalized in violent social
contexts that fall short of the elements of armed conflict. Patterns of
recruitment in gangs and syndicates that engage in drug trafficking, sex
trafficking, and dangerous labor practices, often bear similarities to patterns
of recruitment into armed groups and armed forces. In the end, a holistic
view of youth who endure, transcend, suffer, and propagate violence is, in
my opinion, a propitious path forward to build on the significant
accomplishments effected by law and policy over the past two decades.
Thank you for your time.

